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Handling of Extensible Authentication Protocol Based  
Non-Access Stratum Authentication Failures 
 
Abstract: 
In a 5G System (5GS), the network initiates and controls the authentication method, 
meaning that the network determines whether the user equipment (UE) and the network use EAP-
based NAS authentication or 5G AKA-based NAS authentication for the mutual authentication of 
the UE and the network.  The specification for 5GS presumes that in a 5G standalone case, the UE 
supports both EAP-based NAS authentication and 5G AKA-based NAS authentication.  However, 
not all wireless carriers have required support for EAP-based NAS authentication.  As a result, 
many UEs manufactured do not support EAP-based NAS authentication.  This publication 
describes techniques for preventing an authentication failure in 5GS when the network selects an 
authentication method (e.g., EAP-based NAS authentication) that the UE does not support.   
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Background:  
The 5th Generation (5G) of wireless communication technologies provides for the wide use 
of public networks (e.g., cellular networks), non-public networks (e.g., wireless local area network 
(WLAN), private networks), and IoT environments by user equipment (UE) devices.  In a 
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standalone 5G System (5GS), a UE accesses a network, such as a Public Land Mobile Network 
(PLMN), through a communication link with a base station (e.g., Evolved NodeB (eNB) node, 
Next Generation NodeB (gNB) node) of the network.   The base station can act as a serving cell 
(serving base station) of the network, and a network may have multiple serving cells (serving base 
stations).   
After the UE connects with the base station, for example, after completion of a Radio 
Resource Control connection setup procedure, the UE initiates registration with the network 
utilizing an NAS Attach Procedure.  During the NAS Attach Procedure, the UE and the network 
utilize a credential-based mutual authentication method for the authentication of the UE and the 
network.  In some aspects, the credentials are a shared key that both the UE and the network have 
access to, such as a SIM-based credential (e.g., Subscriber Identification Module (SIM), Universal 
Subscriber Identification Module (USIM), Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC)) utilized by 
the 5G Authentication and Key Agreement (5G AKA) and Extensible Authentication Protocol 
Authentication and Key Agreement Prime (EAP-AKA’) protocols.  In other aspects, the 
credentials are certificate-based, such as a public key certificate shared between the UE and the 
network utilized by the EAP Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) protocol.   
In 5GS, the network initiates and controls the authentication method, meaning that the 
network determines whether the UE and the network use an EAP-based authentication over 5G 
NAS (EAP-based NAS authentication, such as EAP-AKA’ or EAP-TLS) or a 5G AKA-based 
authentication over 5G NAS (5G AKA-based NAS authentication, such as 5G AKA) for the 
mutual authentication of the UE and the network.  The NAS authentication method selected by the 
network may vary based on the environment.  For example, the same system may use: (a) the EAP-
TLS protocol for access to non-public (private) networks and IoT environments, (b) the 5G AKA 
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protocol for 3GPP access to a 3GPP core network, and (c) the EAP-AKA’ protocol for non-3GPP 
access (e.g., Evolution-Data Optimized (EV-DO), wireless local area network (WLAN), WiMAX) 
to a 3GPP core network.   
The specification for 5GS (e.g., 3GPP TS 24.501 v.16.3.0 (2019-12), section 5.4.1.1) 
presumes that in a 5G standalone case, the UE supports both EAP-based NAS authentication and 
5G AKA-based NAS authentication.  However, not all wireless carriers have required support for 
EAP-based NAS authentication.  As a result, many UEs manufactured do not support EAP-based 
NAS authentication.   
Figure 1 illustrates an example in 5GS, where the network selects an authentication method 
that the UE does not support.   
 
Figure 1 
After the UE connects with the base station, the UE initiates registration with the network 
through an NAS Attach Procedure where the UE sends an ATTACH message to the network (not 
shown in Figure 1).  Upon receiving the ATTACH message from the UE, the network determines 
the authentication method used by the system and initiates the authentication of the UE by sending 
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an Authentication Request message to the UE.  For example, the network may send an EAP 
Request message to the UE for EAP-based NAS authentication.   
In the example of Figure 1, the UE is not configured to support the utilization of EAP-
based NAS authentication and cannot decode or encode EAP messages.  This occurs when, for 
example, the UE has a non-public network SIM card (or an Internet of Things capable (IoT-
capable) SIM card) that does not support the EAP protocol over NAS inserted.  Upon receiving 
the EAP Request message from the network, the UE replies with an Authentication Failure 
message.  The Authentication Failure message triggers the network to send an Authentication 
Reject message to the UE.  Upon receiving such an Authentication Reject message, the 5GS 
specification directs the UE to regard the SIM-based credential (e.g., SIM, USIM) as invalid for 
5GS services and invalid for non-Evolved Packet System (EPS) service.  As a result, the UE will 
not have access to normal service until after power-cycling the UE or removal of the UICC 
containing the SIM-based credential.   
 
Description: 
This publication describes techniques for preventing an authentication failure in 5GS when 
the network selects an authentication method that the UE does not support.  One or more of the 
techniques described herein may be utilized individually or together.     
Figure 2 illustrates a first technique for preventing an authentication failure in 5GS when 
the network selects an authentication method (e.g., EAP-based NAS authentication) that the UE 
does not support.   
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 Figure 2 
After the UE connects with the base station, the UE initiates registration with the network 
through an NAS Attach Procedure (e.g., sends an ATTACH message to the network, not shown in 
Figure 2).  Upon receiving the ATTACH message from the UE, the network determines to use an 
EAP-based authentication method (e.g., EAP-AKA’) and initiates the authentication of the UE by 
sending an EAP Authentication Request message (EAP Request) to the UE for EAP authentication 
over 5G NAS.   
Upon receiving the EAP Request message from the network, the UE determines if it 
supports EAP-based NAS authentication.  If the UE cannot handle the EAP protocol, instead of 
sending an Authentication Failure message, the UE sends a hard-coded Authentication Response 
(EAP Response) message to the network.  The hard-coded Authentication Response message 
indicates that the UE does not support EAP-based NAS authentication and/or requests the network 
to change the authentication method to an alternative authentication protocol (e.g., 5G AKA) if the 
network is allowed to do so.  The hard-coded Authentication Response (EAP Response) message 
may be a negative acknowledgment response (NAK Response) message, when the UE finds the 
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desired authentication Type in the EAP Request message unacceptable.  In such a NAK Response, 
Type zero (0) may be used to indicate that the sender (the UE) has suggested no particular 
alternative authentication methods.  Other Type values may indicate that the UE suggests one or 
more alternative authentication methods (e.g., 5G AKA).  The receipt of an Authentication 
Response message that includes a hard-coded EAP Response prompts the network to select an 
alternative authentication method (e.g., 5G AKA protocol) and send a second Authentication 
Request (5G AKA) message to the UE requesting 5G AKA-based NAS authentication.   
Figure 3 illustrates a second technique for preventing an authentication failure in 5GS when 
the network selects an authentication method that the UE does not support.   
 
Figure 3 
After the UE connects with the base station, the UE initiates registration with the network 
through an NAS Attach Procedure (e.g., sends an ATTACH message to the network, not shown in 
Figure 3).  Upon receiving the ATTACH message from the UE, the network determines to use an 
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EAP-based authentication method (e.g., EAP-AKA’, EAP-TLS) and initiates the authentication of 
the UE by sending an EAP Authentication Request message (EAP Request) to the UE for EAP 
authentication over 5G NAS.   
Upon receiving the EAP Request message from the network, the UE determines if it 
supports EAP-based NAS authentication.  If the UE does not support the EAP protocol, the UE 
sends an Authentication Failure message and an Authentication Response message to the network.  
The Authentication Failure message triggers the network to send an Authentication Reject message 
to the UE.  Upon receiving such an Authentication Reject message, the UE does not regard the 
SIM-based credential (e.g., SIM) as invalid for 5GS services, nor does the UE regard the USIM as 
invalid for non-EPS service.  Instead, the UE performs a Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) 
search with another Radio Access Technology (RAT) in an attempt to find another PLMN/RAT 
to perform an NAS Attach procedure with to obtain service that does not require EAP-based NAS 
authentication. 
Figure 4 illustrates a third technique for preventing an authentication failure in 5GS when 
a PLMN (network) selects an authentication method that the UE does not support.  After the UE 
connects with a first cell of a base station of the PLMN, the UE initiates registration with the 
network through an NAS Attach Procedure (e.g., sends an ATTACH message to the network, not 
shown in Figure 4).  Upon receiving the ATTACH message from the UE, the network determines 
to use an EAP authentication method (e.g., EAP-AKA’, EAP-TLS) and initiates the authentication 
of the UE by sending an EAP Authentication Request message (EAP Request) to the UE for EAP 
authentication over 5G NAS.   
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 Figure 4 
Upon receiving the EAP Request message from the network, the UE determines if it 
supports EAP-based NAS authentication.  If the UE cannot handle the EAP protocol, the UE sends 
an Authentication Failure message and an Authentication Response message to the network.  The 
Authentication Failure message triggers the network to send an Authentication Reject message to 
the UE.  Upon receiving such an Authentication Reject message, the UE does not regard the SIM-
based credential (e.g., SIM) as invalid for 5GS services, nor does the UE regard the SIM-based 
credential as invalid for non-EPS service.  Instead, the UE blocks the first cell of the PLMN and 
performs a cell selection procedure that selects a second cell of the PLMN that differs from the 
first cell, where the second cell provides service but does not require EAP-based NAS 
authentication.  By blocking the first cell, the technique prevents camping on a private network or 
IoT cell with the same PLMN. 
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In a fourth technique for preventing an authentication failure in 5GS when a 3GPP core 
network selects an authentication method that the UE does not support, after the UE connects with 
the base station providing 3GPP access to the network, the UE initiates registration with the 
network through an NAS Attach Procedure (e.g., sends an ATTACH message to the network).  
Upon receiving the ATTACH message from the UE, the network determines to use an EAP 
authentication method (e.g., EAP-AKA’, EAP-TLS) and initiates the authentication of the UE by 
sending an EAP Authentication Request message (EAP Request) to the UE for EAP authentication 
over 5G NAS.  Upon receiving the EAP Request message from the network, the UE determines if 
it supports EAP-based NAS authentication.  If the UE cannot handle the EAP protocol, the UE 
sends an Authentication Failure message and an Authentication Response message to the network.  
The Authentication Failure message triggers the network to send an Authentication Reject message 
to the UE.  Upon receiving such an Authentication Reject message, the UE does not regard the 
SIM-based credential (e.g., SIM) as invalid for 5GS services, nor does the UE regard the SIM-
based credential as invalid for non-EPS service.  Instead, the UE performs a cell selection 
procedure that selects a second base station providing non-3GPP access to the network that does 
not require EAP-based NAS authentication. 
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